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Review
After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights
Robert Meister. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
526pp.

Debra L. DeLaet*
In After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights, Robert Meister puts forth an original, subtle,
and provocative critique of mainstream human rights discourse in contemporary global
politics. He describes this discourse, which he capitalizes as Human Rights Discourse
throughout the text, as “… a new discourse of global power that claims to supersede the
cruelties perpetrated by both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries during the
previous two centuries” (3). Meister argues that this discourse creates a false temporal
divide between historical periods of “evil” in which gross violations of human rights are
committed and post-conflict periods of justice during which parties are presumed to move
beyond evil through various mechanisms of transitional justice.
In making this argument, Meister distinguishes among three basic categories of
actors

positioned

differently

vis-à-vis

contemporary

human

rights

discourse.

Perpetrators, those who physically torment victims, may be punished via transitional
justice mechanisms associated with the post-World War II paradigm of human rights.
Victims who “suffered physical torment” (27) under the previous regime may achieve a
certain moral victory through these transitional justice mechanisms even as they continue
to face economic and social inequities that remain in place. Yet, beneficiaries of the
oppressive political, social, and economic system that came before continue to enjoy their
(unjustly won) economic and social advantages and privileges.
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Because the beneficiaries of oppression are not implicated by the contemporary
human rights paradigm, Meister argues that this paradigm cannot foster the attainment of
genuine justice or human rights in response to oppressive political, economic, and social
systems. So long as structural inequities and injustices remain in place, evil still exists,
and real justice and human rights are out of reach. In this way, Meister questions the
validity of the rigid demarcation of the lines between evil and justice. Instead, Meister
claims that the pursuit of transitional justice and human rights perpetuates evil by
encouraging victims of unjust political, social and economic systems to accept only a
minimal definition of justice (the end of active, direct physical violence) while allowing
beneficiaries of these systems to rationalize their ongoing privileges in transitional
systems of governance. In Meister’s words, “Here we reach the crux of the twenty-firstcentury conception of human rights, namely, that there is nothing worse than cruelty and
that cruelty toward physical (animal) bodies is the worst of all” (16). In short, he is
critical of a politics of human rights that prioritizes the protection of political rights that
minimize people’s exposure to violence against the body at the expense of economic,
social, and redistributive rights rooted in a revolutionary sense of social justice and
economic equity.
Not only does Meister suggest that contemporary human rights discourse
inappropriately downplays the importance of economic rights and social justice, but he
also argues that post-World War II human rights discourse ultimately rationalizes the
hegemony of a system of global capitalism that actively serves to undermine the
attainment of human rights broadly defined. In this regard, Meister’s argument depicts
mainstream human rights discourse as a counterrevolutionary project that works against
an alternative, historical conception of human rights encompassing radical ruptures with
unjust economic, social, and political systems through revolutionary means. In short, a
human rights discourse that delegitimizes violence in all forms serves as a break on the
pursuit of a radical conception of human rights that might require violent struggle against
systems of oppression. Indeed, Meister goes so far as to suggest that “… the human rights
culture to be established in the twenty-first century is a continuation, by more benign
means, of the counterrevolutionary project of the twentieth—to assure that beneficiaries
of past oppression will largely be permitted to keep the unjustly produced enrichment
they presently enjoy” (31).
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According to Meister, the agents of change under the contemporary paradigm of
international human rights are governments, international organizations, or nongovernmental organizations who intervene to protect, or provide relief to, the victims of
political violence, regardless of the underlying causes of such violence. In contrast, the
agents of human rights activism under the historic conception of human rights, in
Meister’s view, are the revolutionaries who used violent tactics to advance human
rights—“the revolutionary... [as] the standard paradigm of a militant for human rights”
(20). Within contemporary human rights discourse, militant revolutionaries become the
paradigmatic violators of, rather than fighters for, human rights.
Meister develops his argument by applying this critique of human rights
discourse to an analysis of several specific topics. He begins the book by applying this
critique to an analysis of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
which he depicts as a mechanism that sought to provide a moral victory to victims and a
sense of closure to beneficiaries while leaving an unjust and inequitable economic and
social system essentially intact. By pursuing a model of justice as reconciliation, the TRC
might be seen as representing a continuation of the counterrevolutionary project “… to
the extent that the victims of the old regime let its beneficiaries keep their gains in the
new” (69). He similarly describes national recovery and reconstruction efforts in the
United States after the Civil War as mechanisms which prioritized the (re)construction of
a national identity and moving beyond the divisive past at the expense of distributive
justice. Meister also includes a full chapter on the issue of reparations as a mechanism for
responding to past and current economic injustices and argues that a “gains-based”
approach to property law warrants calling for reparations from beneficiaries of unjust
economic gains even in the absence of clear cut “victims” to whom concomitant
economic losses might be traced.
The primary contribution of Meister’s book is to bring a contradiction within the
prevailing paradigm of human rights to the center of analysis. Contemporary human
rights discourse is grounded on the premise that politically-motivated physical violence
against innocent persons is always wrong. Yet, global norms calling for humanitarian
intervention and a “responsibility to protect” on the part of an ill-defined international
community suggest that prohibitions against the use of politically-motivated physical
violence are over-ridden when such violence is committed by “the international
community” in the name of global human rights.
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At a fundamental level, the assumption is that humanitarian intervention by the
“international community” rises above politics and reflects a presumptively ethical use of
violence. Of course, humanitarian intervention by the international community, a
“community” whose interests and actions are determined primarily by the preferences
and policies of major powers, is no less political than military actions carried out by local
actors. Thus, Meister challenges proponents of human rights to consider why military
actions initiated at the global level by an “international community” dominated by major
powers should be considered, by definition, ethical even when “collateral damage”
occurs whereas as militarist movements in specific localities are always deemed to
violate human rights when innocent civilians are victims, even if these movements are
motivated by an underlying concern with human rights and justice. Moreover, Meister’s
analysis raises questions about the extent to which beneficiaries of injustice, even if they
are not direct perpetrators of violence, should be considered innocent.
In short, Meister is asking readers to consider when and against whom the use of
violence for human rights ends should be considered legitimate. Unfortunately, Meister
does not ultimately give us a set of tools for answering this question. Although the book’s
tone suggests that he is sympathetic to the use of militant violence to advance a radical
vision of economic equity and social justice, he ultimately waffles on this point. “Do my
misgivings about justice-as-reconciliation make me nostalgic for the revolutionary
project of the twentieth century? Yes, in the limited sense that we need to oppose,
politically and ethically, the ways in which Human Rights Discourse protects the
beneficiaries of past injustice. I believe, however, that an adequate successor to the
revolutionary project must begin with the recognition that moral victory is a sine qua non
for political victory—but without thereby dropping the demand for distributive justice”
(69). In short, Meister poses a critical question about the legitimacy of the use of violence
towards human rights ends but falls short of providing us with a meaningful set of criteria
to apply in the messy world of real politics.
Meister’s work is primarily philosophical rather than empirical, which leaves
him open to criticism from empirically-oriented social scientists. For example, he
overstates the extent to which states have embraced the Responsibility to Protect doctrine
under international law. Meister claims that “… it is clear that global politics (insofar as it
successfully avoids issues of wealth and resource distribution) is now focused on
humanitarian intervention to stop atrocities committed at the local level” (48). In fact, the
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international community, dominated by the major powers, has a notably weak record in
responding to genocide and other humanitarian crises (a point Meister acknowledges), as
the millions of dead in Rwanda, Darfur, and other sites of modern-day genocides starkly
illustrate. When major powers do intervene abroad, the rhetoric of “humanitarian
intervention” often (but not always) merely provides cover for the underlying strategic
interests motivating such interventions. In short, Meister may take states’ deployment of
the rhetoric of human rights too seriously. To the extent that a narrow conception of
political rights focused on humanitarian protection appears to trump economic and social
rights in the contemporary human rights paradigm, it may be more of a reflection of
classic power politics in international relations than a genuine prioritization of political
over economic rights.
Mainstream human rights scholars likely will also take issue with Meister’s
claim that the prioritization of political, physical violence against the human body in
contemporary human rights discourse is counterrevolutionary. In making this claim,
Meister assumes a dichotomous vision of human rights that assumes that a clear cut
choice exists between two paradigms—a human rights discourse that seeks to
delegitimize political violence even at the expense of leaving structural inequities in place
and a revolutionary paradigm of human rights where political violence might be tolerated
as a means for achieving economic and social justice. In short, he assumes that the
sacrifice of political rights under a revolutionary approach to human rights will produce
better results in the economic and social spheres. Many liberal proponents of human
rights will reject this proposition. Moreover, Meister criticizes the liberal human-rights
paradigm for prioritizing the suffering of the body (160–61), but isn’t the suffering of
human bodies also what is at stake in regards to fundamental economic rights? Indeed,
abject poverty produces some of the most degrading and devastating bodily suffering
imaginable, and I have always recognized such bodily suffering as a primary rationale for
fundamental economic and social rights.
Throughout the book, Meister draws upon insights from a wide range of
disciplines, including political theory, history, literature, psychology, religion, and law
and, in doing so, demonstrates an impressive interdisciplinarity. In addition to applying
his critique of mainstream human rights discourse to prevailing approaches to transitional
justice, Meister weaves in a wide range of intriguing arguments and ideas, including a
view of truth commissions as social melodrama, religious and literary meditations on
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sorrow and disgrace, a discussion of the evolution of the concept of trauma, the roots of
genocide in colonial concepts of “natives” and “settlers,” and the role of psychological
processes in shaping individual reactions and social responses to human rights abuses and
genocide. A nuanced consideration of these additional ideas goes well beyond the scope
of this review. Suffice it to say that After Evil is an ambitious work that should be read
widely by scholars interested in human rights. Even mainstream human rights scholars
who are likely to disagree with his underlying argument about the value of the prevailing
paradigm of human rights in contemporary global politics and with many of his
conclusions will find the work thought-provoking and impressive in the scope and
sophistication of ideas covered.

